Masquerading malicious campaign through unintended IDOR

AHMEDABAD

whoamioffice hours







Ahmad Ashraff bin Ahmad

Building Malaysia's ethical hacking community of the future Sungai Petani, Kedah, Malaysia · Contact info

SECURITY



whoamibugbounty



3rd place in #beta022 @bugcrowd ! result notification got something ner

11:25 PM · Aug 24, 2013 · Twitter Web Client

Approach

- manual
- easy vulnerability against complex targets
- complex vulnerability against targets
- sleep

st complex targets ainst targets

nsecure **Direct Object** Reference **IDOR**

Insecure Direct Object Reference (called IDOR from here) occurs when a application exposes a reference to an internal implementation object


Profile A

https://www.target.com/profile.php?id=1



Profile B

https://www.target.com/profile.php?id=99



id=[value]

brute-forceenumerate

Profile C https://www.target.com/profile.php? uuid=c869fbe5-a05e-4397-9cead7712ec69cbb



Profile D https://www.target.com/profile.php? uuid=4cde2bbe-f8b8-434b-8dc6-8b5fc0b09d73




uuid=[value]





leaked in the application waybackmachine search engines


Marketing software/tools





shared IP
custom domain
same URL patterns












Campaign by company JK



https://jk.com/yolo/ads.php? id=WI4MBlcdU1ZaBQpbUw0CBE8m








REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA



Campaign by company ABC



https://abc.com/yolo/ads.php? id=UlcDB1dTHINRBAZaUAACAwXmmm




O nosso administrador Francisco Barbeira, e Nuno Filipe, Diretor de Recursos Humanos, fazem um ponto de situação consigo, sobre o tema Coronavírus. Veja as declarações.

Esta favo


A pi Rua OS 6 pelo

serv Ace




Johnnie Side,

VER VÍDEO 3



Campaign by company JK



https://jk.com/yolo/ads.php? id=UlcDB1dTHINRBAZaUAACAwXmmm




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
A pi Rua OS 6 pelo

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
Johnnie Side,

VER VÍDEO 3






Campaign by Company LOL



https://lol.com/yolo/ads.php? id=UlcDB1dTHINRBAZaUAACAwMZMQ==




Campaign by Company JK



https://jk.com/yolo/ads.php? id=UlcDB1dTHINRBAZaUAACAwMZMQ==





Campaign by Company ABC




https://abc.com/yolo/ads.php? id=UlcDB1dTHINRBAZaUAACAwMZMQ==















https://tools.gg.com/response/jk-ggmufc/calc/auto07





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
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
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
https://tools.gg.com/response/jkggmufc/calc/auto01/tool.abc

- extension is unique .abc
- has "tool", "calc", "tools", "calculators"
- jk = the software/tool name
- ggmufc = organisation's name
- auto01 = the option used/enabled









https://tools.gg.com/response/jkggmufc/calc/auto01/tool.abc

https://tools.gg.com/tools/jkfarmfamily/savings01/tool.abc

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                                                  l.org/tools/statefarm/savin_sul/tool.
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   <script type="text/javascript" defer="defer" src="//ipinvice.ipercept;</pre>
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   </div>
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   <!-- Align Wrapper -->
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   </div>
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   <script>
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   learningcenter.article_init();
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   });
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   </script>
```


different organisation


https://tools.gg.com

Javascript files loaded from other domain

So? What a LOL staff can do?

- subscribe to the same tool/software
- upload own malicious Javascript
- load LOL content on other domains that using the same tool/software





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