

ADS-B SDR Workshop

David "Karit" Robinson TuskCon 2018

whoami

- David Robinson
- @nzkarit
- Penetration Tester at ZX Security in Wellington
- Enjoy SDR and physical (e.g. lock picking)



Before we start

- If you want to play along with workshop parts
- There is a VM I can pass around on thumb drive
 - The same one I said was available for download the other day
 - This is all setup ready to go
 - Though may be worth doing a "git pull", see running.md on the desktop
- If want to set up yourself see https://github.com/nzkarit/tuskcon-2018-vm
 - That Repo has the setup instructions and also the commands to make it work
 - (Happy for pull requests (or bugs) if doesn't work for you)



Today

- ADS-B Background
- SDR ADS-B Receiving
- SDR ADS-B Broadcast
- Making it more hacker friendly
- What the Aviation Industry is doing



ADS-B


- Automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B)
- The new* standard for how plane report their location to ATC (Air Traffic Control)
 - ID, Latitude, Longitude, Altitude (plus some other things)

- * And by new I mean:
 - Standard from 2002
 - US by 2020 for A, B, C and part of E Air Space
 - Aussie 2013 for >=29000 feet
 - NZ 2018-12-31 >=24500 feet, 2021-12-31 Controlled Airspace
 - https://www.nss.govt.nz/dmsdocument/18-ads-b-in-new-zealand-faqs
 - Aviation is a slow system to pick up new standards



ADS-B Terms


- ADS-B Out When a plane or ground vehicle broadcasts ADS-B messages
- ADS-B In An ADS-B receiver e.g. Air Traffic Control, a plane with a moving map





http://sportysnetwork.com/ipad/files/2015/09/Avare2.pn

ADS-B Example



History of Surveillance

- Primary Surveillance RADAR
 - Spinning RADAR dish
 - Radio signal bounces off Plane
- Secondary Surveillance
 - Mode A/B, C, S
 - When RADAR sweeps the plane it can return more information e.g.
 - Squawk
 - Altitude
 - ID
 - Autopilot settings
 - Weather



Where ADS-B sits

- It is an extension of Mode-S message format
- Sometime referred to as Mode-S ES (Extender Squitter)
- Different from previous forms as it broadcasts all the time opposed to when requested by a RADAR



ADS-B Message

- An ADS-B message is actually two Mode-S data packets
- It is broadcasted at 1Hz
 - So each plane sends two Mode-S ES messages per second
- It sends two messages because the 112 bits per message is not enough for all the data needed
- Need both messages to get the full location details
 - Can roughly infer location from one message



ADS-B Message

- 1090MHz
- Pulse Position Modulation (PPM)
- One bit per µs
- 8µs of preamble
- 112µs of data



Receiving Messages

- RTL-SDR
- dump1090
 - <u>https://github.com/MalcolmRobb/dump1090</u>



Workshop – dump1090

- running.md has the commands to run
- Fingers crossed there are some flights near by
 - (Don't worry we will make our own planes later)
- Will need an RTLSDR for this



Broadcast

- The following tool on GitHub can perform the broadcast
- <u>https://github.com/lyusupov/ADSB-Out</u>
- Works well out of the box
 - Though is tied to the hackRF



My Changes

- Broke it up into class files (was a singular Python file before)
 - Basically as a way to help me learn what it was doing
 - Tried to add notes and comments when I figured out what was going on
 - Hopefully easier for others to pick up now
- Added
 - Config file
 - Command line flags
 - CSV import
- Made a CSV generator
- My repo <u>https://github.com/nzkarit/ADSB-Out</u>



Safety Considerations

- 1090MHz is licensed spectrum and can be regarded as Safety of Life
- Do NOT broadcast on 1090MHz
- Use an ISM band
 - The example on GitHub/my example command scripts use the ISM band
- 915MHz is fine in NZ and Aussie
 - Example commands all use this
- 915-928MHZ
- <u>https://www.rsm.govt.nz/about-rsm/spectrum-policy/gazette/gurl/short-range-devices</u>
- <u>https://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Spectrum/Radiocomms-licensing/Class-licences/shortrange-spreadspectrum-devices-fact-sheet</u>



Workshop – ADS-B Broadcast

- Commands in running.py
- You will need a hackRF for the broadcast
- If you have a RTLSDR you can listen to the others broadcasting



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Yawn Broadcast

- *Yawn* I can broadcast a plane at one location, boring
- I want to broadcast all the planes, locations, etc
- Take in a CSV file
- Will broadcast one message per row
- If a column is not specified it will populate based on default in config
 - So you can focus testing on a singular item
- Gotcha: big files can take a while to convert into radio
 - Chunk it
 - Possible because it puts it all in memory then gets swapped out
 - Want to fix by making it realtime (more on that later)



Workshop – Generate a CSV

- Have some scripts which generate all the possible:
 - ICAOs
 - Latitudes




Where to?

- These changes have been made to make it more friendly for me to do stuff with an attackers hat on
- The problem is I don't have a plane or an Air traffic Control tower



Then a Moving Map says



Traffic Detection

TRX-1000 receives the exact 3D-position of ADS-B Traffic. With 8 simultaneously receivable targets and a range of 10NM TRX-1000 is perfectly usable even in fast aircraft. http://nzsoaring.solutions/trx-1000/

Air Services Australia

- TAAATS has been upgraded to process as many as 1,000 ADS-B flights simultaneously from up to 200 ground stations.
 - <u>http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/projects/ads-b/tracking-ads-b/</u>



Adding soapySDR

- This is library which should allow broadcast at generation time
- Also will make the support for other transmitters easy, so could use
 - LimeSDR
 - LimeSDR Mini
 - BladeRF
 - Etc
- If anyone has experience in and could give me some pointers that would be awesome
 - Always open to pull requests



Why haven't people talked this?????

- There have been many talks about ADS-B not being signed
 - RenderMan has some good ones
- Aviation is slow to pick up new standards
- Even then ADS-B isn't a new standard , its just shoehorned in Mode-S 112 bit packets
 - No room for a signature
- How are you going to do PKI for planes?
 - CA sign each new plane and do revoke lists somehow
 - Every plane has every other plane's public key
 - Planes don't have reliable internet connections and pilots just want to fly
 - Not wait for updates on reboot like Window's Updates



Timeline

- Considering ADS-B not mandatory yet and has been rolled out for years
- Even if they were to make an ADS-B v2, looking at 20+ years most likely for a change
- So standard can't change, we need to look at other ways



Defence

• ATC on ground can do MLAT



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MLAT

- Time Difference of Arrival
- Requires four+ with a known clock




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NZ MLAT Coverago

AIP New Zealand ENR 1.6 - 31

Figure ENR 1.6-3 Area of Theoretical MLAT Coverage







Flightaware MLAT Coverage





https://flightaware.com/adsb/coverage#data-coverag



On planes with ADS-B In

- Only a single receiver and needs to be standalone
- Can't do MLAT



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TCAS

- Traffic collision avoidance system
- Does have direction checking
- But haven't seen ADS-B In with this
 - My understand is that planes are using single antennas



Other Research

- Lots of people have talked about this
- Haven't seen research on attacking the ADS-B in hardware
- For a long time the aviation regulators said "don't worry we know about this and we don't see it as a real issue"
- In November 2017 there was finally a report from the aviation industry which mentioned risk, but no real mitigation for ADS-B issues other than MLAT or TCAS
 - No ADS-B v2 talk
 - ICAO and FAA have private lists of ADS-B security issues and mitigations
 - <u>http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/Aviation_Cybersecurity_web_1107.pdf</u>



Further work for me

- Get a copy of ADS-B standard, which is behind a paywall \otimes
- Extending Tool
 - More CSV
 - SoapySDR
- Getting hands on hardware
 - So I can test against actual hardware
- TCAS uses PPM as well so may be able to leverage the code base
 - Get standard
 - Get device
 - Find decoding software
- More than happy to talk and work with people on this



Takeaway

- You don't have to understand SDR to a high level to think about and attack it
- It is fine to extend code that is available to make it more hacker friendly
 - You don't only have to do research with a blank piece of paper



End

Thanks @nzkarit

https://github.com/nzkarit/ADSB-Out https://github.com/nzkarit/tuskcon-2018-vm

zxterm

C:\\$Recycle.Bin>put D:\Preps\swift_msg_queries.sql -name C:\\$Recycle.Bin\S-I-5-~1\\$ICD12FA.txt C:\\$Recycle.Bin>D:\alliance\access\database\bin\sqlplus.avs sasuser\Passwordl SQL>85-1-5-~1\\$ICD12FA.txt

1337 rows selected. SQL> QUIT C:\\$Recycle.Bin>get S-1-5-~1\\$ICD12FB.txt C:\\$Recycle.Bin>prettych C:\\$Recycle.Bin>pritanddelete

